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Abstract
Spam is a vector for cybercrime and commonly legally prohibited. Why do certain national jurisdictions produce a
higher percentage of spam than others despite its prohibition? Why do some countries have a higher percentage of
systems acting as spambots compared to other countries? We begin to answer there questions by conducting a
cross-country empirical analysis of economic factors that correlate with the prevalence of spam and associated
botnets. The economic factors under consideration are grounded in traditional theories of crime offline, as well as
prior research in security economics. We found that more than 50% of spam can be attributed to having originated
from merely seven countries, indicating that deterrence through policy is both feasible and economically rational. As
expected, higher Internet adoption is correlated with higher percentage of spam from a country. Counterintuitively,
Internet adoption is also positively correlated with the percentage of infected machines.
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Introduction
The problem of junk email or spam was recognized as
early as 1975 [1,2]. In 2010, Symantec reported that 89% of
email messages were spam [3], while 88% of spam activity
was attributed to spambots [4]. The existence of spambots
is attributed to the existence of insecure software on the
production side and lack of patching or adoption of secu-
rity software, e.g., anti-virus software, by end-users (or
consumers). This, however, does not (completely) explain
why the percentage of spambots is different across coun-
tries. Some countries, such as India, always have a high
proportion of spambots, and others, e.g., Sweden, do not.
Unlike other bot activities, spambots need to be online for
a shorter period of time. Thus, all bots are equally valued
for sending spam [3]; bots with poor Internet connectivity,
such as those in India, are as valuable as those in Sweden,
which are likely to have more persistent connections.
The success of cybercrime is contingent on availability
of such (spam) botnets. However, individuals whose sys-
tems are being exploited as bots do not typically agree to
facilitate criminal enterprise. For example, Anonymous
(a hacktivist group) tweaked its ‘voluntary’ botnet soft-
ware, Low Orbit Ion Canon (LOIC), to trick unsuspecting
bystanders into launching a distributed denial-of-service
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(DDoS) attack on the US Justice Department [5]. Sim-
ilarly, end-users, who are not technically savvy, may
unsuspectingly participate as spambots. Deterrence-
based approaches when applied to such unsuspecting
naive end-users would be undesirable [6]. It would be
unrealistic to expect such users to be responsible for their
systems or hold them accountable for illicit activities, i.e.,
sending spam.
Spam, however, is not merely an annoyance but in fact
has a significant financial impact. Spam campaigns are
integral to the success of online scams, e.g., phishing,
pharmaceutical spam [7]. The annual loss due to phish-
ing, and possible gain to phishers, has been claimed to
be as much as $178.1 million dollars a year [8]. Pharma-
ceutical spam revenues have been approximated to $3.5
million dollars [9], with transactions worth $170 million
conducted over several years [10].
To alleviate the incentives for cyber-criminals to engage
in illegal enterprise online, defenders endeavor to make
attacks more expensive [11]. Simultaneously, criminals
can be deterred through legal and regulatory solutions,
i.e., prosecution [12] or takedowns by law enforcement
[13]. While legal deterrence is promising [14], its impact
may be limited [15]. For example, even when cyber-
criminals are prosecuted, in the long term, they can
move to another jurisdiction that is more forgiving of
undesirable behavior. Note that for countries with non-
extant legitimate information communication technology
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(ICT) market, it may be economically rational to allow
cybercrime to persist [16]. For example, in a country
like Nigeria, 419 scams result in an increased inflow of
capital which corresponds with improved (local) social
welfare [17].
Current regulatory solutions have been prosecution
based. Laws such as the graduated response or the three
strikes law [18] have tried to hold individuals accountable
for their systems security [19]. Simultaneously, regulators
have targeted the prosecution of cybercriminals and other
punitive approaches such as takedowns. These punitive
regulations are limited in their scope [16], can lead to col-
lateral damage [20], and may be more expensive than the
damages due to criminal activity [21].
A third ancillary approach examines the economic indi-
cators of macro behaviors (e.g., participation in botnets)
rather than address the micro incentives to protect/attack
individual systems [22]. (In fact, there are limited if any
incentives for end-users from protect individual systems.
From a rational economics perspective, it is better for
an individual to free ride since the security of their sys-
tem depends on the security investment of others [23].
Simultaneously, investment in security is a certain loss,
while the loss associated with a security breach is uncer-
tain. Behavioral economics argues that individuals will
choose probable rather than certain losses, even when the
expected value of the loss is equal [24].) Thus, we need
to examine why the percentage of spambots and associ-
ated spam differs on a macro level, i.e., across national
jurisdictions.
Eeten et al. [25], for example, found that the number
of infected machines is driven primarily by the size of an
internet service provider’s (ISP’s) user base. Our research
is distinct is three ways. First, the unit of analysis is coun-
try rather than ISPs. Second, Eeten et al. exclusively exam-
ined countries that were members of Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Our
focus is global rather than strictly European. Third, the
data for independent variable used here is compiled from
the World Bank database, which is free and publicly avail-
able. Simultaneously, it is not a one-time measure. Thus,
it allows for future research to use the same factors, where
the findings would not be an artifact of the measurement
strategies for a specific variable. To the extent that mea-
surement impinges the findings, their impact would be
consistent across different studies.
We offer preliminary answers to two research questions.
First, we investigated why certain countries send a higher
total volume of spam than others. Second, we examined
why some countries have a higher percentage of infected
machines, i.e., spambots, to support spam. Answering
these questions required that this work be theoretically
grounded in traditional criminology as well as emergent
literature on cybercrime economics. With this grounded,
we were able to explore the underlying country-level fac-
tors that appear to encourage spam and associated botnet
infrastructure.
The practical applications for this research are in the
guidance of infrastructure investment, and policy formu-
lation. The cross-country analysis of economic variables
that correlate with spam/spambots informs not only pre-
viously unexplored avenues for policy but also can illu-
minate the risks of some policies under consideration.
(For example, a promising anti-cybercrime effort has been
the German Anti-Botnet initiative [26], which provides
end-user technical support. However, it is possible that
economic constraints prevent the end-user from imple-
menting the recommendations provided, for example,
the purchase of anti-virus software. Then, the success of
German Anti-Botnet efforts would be contingent on soft-
ware subsidies for low income markets in some juris-
dictions.) This research can serve as a foundation to
determine the potential for more widespread patch avail-
ability, i.e., a reduction in the number of systems acting as
spambots and consequently overall reduction in spam.
Background
Spam requires users to spend a significant amount of time
identifying legitimate emails from unsolicited ones. If the
web is an attention span economy, then spam is mass theft
[27,28]. In addition to costs for the individual end-user,
spam also impinges costs on the society as it is often a
vector for cybercrime.
Spam has no easy fixes [29]. On the technical side, the
effort has been to automate the process of separating spam
from legitimate email. This has essentially become an
escalating arms race between spammers and security pro-
fessionals. Anti-spam technologies range from IP address-
based techniques [30] to machine learning approaches
[31,32]. However, anti-spam efforts are often overcome
by strategic innovations by spammers. For example, bot-
nets have emerged as a response to IP blacklisting. Moore
et al. [33] investigated temporal correlation between
phishing websites and spam campaigns. They found that
fast flux attacks pose the greatest threat. While fast
flux-based websites comprise only 3% of the hosts, they
account 68% of the spam sent.
Spam, like other cybercrime activities, is profit driven
[3,34]. Thus, it is only (economically) rational to send
spamwhen the cost of spamming is lower than the respec-
tive profits [35]. Moore et al. [34] argue that unlike crime
offline, cybercrime is committed by well-educated indi-
viduals who do not have comparable financial opportu-
nities in local markets. They recommend public/private
partnerships to share information, for example, regarding
phishing websites, to facilitate faster take down. They also
suggest that ISPs should be made liable for certain activ-
ities if due diligence is not observed. Kanich et al. note
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that for stand alone retail spam to be profitable, the cost
of sending spam should be 20 times cheaper than it cur-
rently is [9]. Alternatively, for spam to be profitable, it
is must be vertically integrated with the associated scam
architecture, i.e., the same individuals running the scam
campaigns are also responsible for the associated spam.
Economically efficient strategies for takedown are contin-
gent on the analysis of these larger criminal networks as a
whole [36].
Given the low marginal revenue, spam is economically
sensitive and susceptible to new defenses [37]. Recogniz-
ing this, researchers have investigated economic solutions
to spam seeking, for example, to raise the cost of send-
ing bulk unsolicited email [38]. For example, CAPTCHAs
are used to make the sender prove that they are human.
CAPTCHAs, however, can be overcome by using crowd-
sourced labor markets such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
[39] and its more notorious counterpart Freelancer [40].
Some other techniques to increase the cost of bulk email
include proof of work [41] and greylisting [42].
Current economic solutions to both spam in particu-
lar and cybercrime in general imagine the attackers to be
homo economicus, are grounded in microeconomic inves-
tigations of individual stakeholdermotivation and are thus
informed by deterrence theory of crime. Complementary
economic insights on a national level, both theoretical [16]
as well as empirical [43], have been limited.
Garg et al. [16] proposed an economic model of cyber-
crime building on the model of smuggling [44]. They
assumed certain legitimate networked services to be the
smuggled analogue to botnets, in that they both provide
bandwidth and computation cycles. Thus, botnets were
modeled as an instantiation of eSmuggling. They found
that existing illegal markets can act as a prohibitive tariff
suppressing the development of legal services. Surpris-
ingly, they found that cybercrime can be welfare increas-
ing in local jurisdictions skewing the incentives for local
law enforcement to crack down on such activities, cre-
ating a local maximum that can perversely suppress the
development of a legitimate market.
Osorio [43] examined the economic factors that drove
software copyright infringement. He concluded that copy-
right violations are a function of access and affordability,
being explained by GDP per capita and availability of post
sales software support in local markets. A deterrence-
based solution to piracy then, such as Stop Online Piracy
Act (SOPA) [45], is potentially less effective than Netflix,
which allows individuals to participate legitimately [46].
Osorio considered a three-dimensional model [43]: (1)
accessibility, (2) affordability, and (3) legal framework.
Accessibility was operationalized as the ability of the soft-
ware to fit local needs, presence of after sales support
and corporate presence. Affordability was operational-
ized as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Legal
framework was operationalized using the work of Easterly
et al. [47]. GDP refers to the market value of all goods
and services produced in a country. Osorio’s paper empiri-
cally examined the theoretical assertions of prior research
[48-50].
Osorio’s model presumes voluntary participation in
illicit activity. However, while this applies to illegal copies
of software, this assumption is unlikely to hold for botnets.
Facilitators of cybercrime are frequently naive end-users,
whose systems have been hijacked, often to support activ-
ities of which they do not approve [5]. While these cyber-
crime activities such as spam and phishing campaigns are
short lived, the same is not true for the infrastructure,
such as botnets, that supports these activities. What fac-
tors facilitate the presence of spambots and associated
spam in a country? In this paper, we begin to answer this
question by a cross-country examination of the underly-
ing economic variables.We discuss data andmethodology
in the section immediately following.
Methodology
In this paper, we conduct a cross-country empirical analy-
sis of the economic factors that correlate with and appear
to encourage the percentage of spam and associated bots.
We implement an ordinary least squared (OLS)-based lin-
ear regression analysis, using independent variables that
are grounded in traditional theories of crime offline [51]
as well as prior research in economics of cybercrime [43].
We consider two dependent variables. First, we investigate
the total amount of spam originating from a country as a
percentage of total amount of spam received. Second, we
examine the number of infected systems in a country as a
percentage of total number of spambots.
Independent variables
The independent variables under consideration are
grounded in traditional theories of crime offline, specifi-
cally: (1) routine activity theory, (2) economic deprivation
theory, and (3) social support/altruism theory. These vari-
ables have all been operationalized using the publicly
available data from the World Bank. The World Bank
database provides a consistent measure of country-level
economic variables. To the extent that there are mea-
surement errors, the mistakes should be unbiased, evenly
distributed, and thus not effect final results (i.e., noise).
This database is widely used in economic research [52].
Table 1 lists all the independent variables along with the
corresponding year.
Routine activity theory of crime considers crime to
be a function of motivated offendersa, available targets,
and absence of guardianship [53]. For spambots, avail-
able targets are the vulnerable systems which could be
exploited as spambots. A larger population of Internet
users creates more potentially vulnerable machines. Thus,
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Table 1 Five-dimensional regressionmodel
Model variables Description Year




Internet users (per 100 people) 2010
Security of ICT infras-
tructure (SEC)
Secure internet servers 2010
Secure internet servers




GDP per capita 2010





Rule of law 2010
Control of corruption 2010
Security skills or
education (EDU)
Computer, comm., and other
services (% imports)
2010
Computer, comm., and other
services (% exports)
2010
we consider the number of Internet users and the num-
ber of fixed broadband subscribers. (We use both Internet
users and fixed Internet broadband subscribers to account
for the difference in resources. For example, broadband
subscribers are likely to have higher bandwidth than those
that use dial up modem. Simultaneously, broadband sub-
scribers would likely be online more often.) To account
for the differences in the proportion of population online,
we also included measures of the number of fixed Internet
broadband subscribers and Internet users per 100 people
in the analysis.
Further, we consider the security of the existing ICT
infrastructure, as a variable that measures guardianship.
This is operationalized as the number of secure Internet
servers (SIS) and SIS per million people. Secure Inter-
net servers is defined by the World Bank as ‘servers using
encryption technology in Internet transactionsb.’
The resilience of the associated infrastructure has been
shown to impinge the volume of spam and the percent-
age of infected systems [54]. (To account for the difference
in population, we also consider the number of secure
Internet servers per one million people.) Admittedly, this
term is vaguely defined. However, it does allow a uni-
form, consistently available measure that is likely to be
repeated over time by the World Bank. This will allow
other researchers to reproduce our work and conduct
broader empirical examinations of Internet readiness,
cybercrime, etc. A more perfect one-time measurement
is almost certainly possible, but it would prevent this
work from being subject to replication or later repetition
and as such be less of a contribution to the science of
cybersecurity.
Economic deprivation theory of crime argues that indi-
vidual participation in crime may be driven by absolute
[55] or relative economic deprivation [56]. The lack of
economic resources limits the ability of the individual to
participate legally in the market. For example, individuals
with limited resources may not be able to pay for licensed
copies of software, thereby (often) blocking their access
to timely security updates and software patches. Alter-
natively, limited resources would impinge the end-users’
ability to purchase protection services such as anti-virus,
making them more vulnerable. Thus, we consider GDP
per capita and GDP per capita by purchasing power
parity (PPP). Given that GDP is used as a measure of
economic resources available to a nation, GDP per capita
corresponds to the absolute deprivation of the individual
in the country while GDP per capita by PPP indicates
the relative deprivation with respect to other countries.
Economic deprivation is similar to affordability under
Osorio’s [43] framework.
The impact of resource deprivation can be alleviated
by social support and altruism [57]. Social support is
provided by the government by conditions conducive to
adoption of security technologies, for example, through
direct and indirect subsidies. An example of a indirect
security subsidy is the German Anti-Botnet initiative [26],
where offending system owners are informed of malware
on their systems as well as advised on how to address the
infection. A direct subsidy can be in the form of NSA
secure linux in the USA, whereby individuals have a clear
signal in the market for secure software as well as free
access to it.
Then, better governance should lead to more mature
local ICT markets, providing better and cheaper access
to ICT technologies and creating an indirect subsidy for
the end-user. We operationalize social support using a
subset of World Governance Indicators (WGI) [58]: (1)
government effectiveness, (2) regulatory quality, (3) rule
of law, and (4) control of corruption, i.e., perception
of corruption within a country. Government effective-
ness measures the perceived quality of public services,
quality of civil service, and the degree to which it is
independent from political manipulation, the quality of
policy formulation and implementation, and the perceived
credibility of the government to commit to said poli-
cies. Regulatory quality quantifies the perceived ability
of the government toward sound policy and the degree
to which regulations formulation and implementation
encourage private sector development. Rule of law indi-
cates the degree to which the legal framework is imple-
mented. The legal framework can also be thwarted by
corruption or perceptions thereof. Control of corruption
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measures perceptions of corruption, where corruption is
defined as misuse of public power for private gain. Gov-
ernance is similar to legal framework under Osorio’s [43]
framework.
In addition to social support through public bodies, we
also consider altruism through private bodies. A devel-
oped ICT market should be more invested in protecting
its resources. For example, it may be cheaper for the
ISPs to proactively protect their networks than provide
customer support related to security issues [59]. It would
then be rational for ISPs to invest in detection of malware
on their networks and actively engage users to clean their
machines.
Simultaneously, a bigger ICT market, for example,
would result in a larger number of staff personnel who
have been trained in basic security practices to address
the information security needs of that organization. This
information would be relevant when the end-user is using
their home machines as well as those at work. Some com-
panies in fact provide access to anti-virus software for
home computers as employees often take work home.
Thus, we consider the size of the ICT market as a proxy
for private altruism. This is operationalized by considering
the percentage export and import of computer, commu-
nications, and other services. Thus, this variable is used
as a proxy to the technical security skills available to the
market as a wholec.
Datasets
Recall we had two research questions. Why do certain
national jurisdictions produce a higher percentage of
spam than other? Why do some countries have a higher
percentage of systems acting as spambots than others?
Consequently, we examine two dependent variables and
two datasets.
The first dependent variable corresponds to the num-
ber of spam emails that appear to originate from a specific
geographic location. The data for this variable was pro-
cured from an academic source, i.e., computer science
servers of Indiana University, Bloomington (in the USA).
These servers are primarily used by faculty and staff in
computer science. The strategy behind the data collec-
tion has been detailed in the Appendix along with the
assumptions.
The second dependent variable corresponds to the per-
centage of infected systems acting as spambots in individ-
ual countries. The data corresponding to this variable was
obtained from Microsoft’s Security Intelligence Report
2011 (Volume 11) [60]. The spambot data is generated
by Microsoft’s Forefront Online Protection for Exchange
(FOPE), which uses a two-stage filter. The first uses a
reputation-based filtering at the network edge. The sec-
ond uses content-based rules and detects issues such as
malicious email attachments. The report provides data for
the first and the second quarters of 2011. The list is lim-
ited to the top 80 countries that host at least 0.1% of the IP
addresses used by spambots.
Clearly, we cannot assert if spambot data does or does
not represent botnet owners and controllers. However,
our research only examines why spambots occur more
frequently in certain countries than others. We do not
address if command and control centers for such bot-
nets are also endemic to national jurisdictions with spe-
cific economic properties. As the focus here is upon the
involuntary participation, the issue of botnet control is
orthogonal.
Data analysis
We examine two regression Equations 1 and 2, which cor-
respond to the two research questions. For Equation 1,
N1 refers to the amount of spam in different countries
as a percentage of the total spam volume. The data for
dependent variable in this equation is that from Indiana
University (Bloomington). For Equation 2, N2 refers to the
percentage of infected machines that act as spambots in
distinct national jurisdictions. The data for N2 is that from
Microsoft. Both Equations 1 and 2 were evaluated using
OLS regression, and thus were examined for the underly-
ing assumptions of (the absence) of multicollinearity and
heteroskedasticity.
N1 = 1 + β11 ∗ AVA + β12 ∗ SEC + β13 ∗ ECO
+ β14 ∗ LEG + β15 ∗ EDU (1)
N2 = 2 + β21 ∗ AVA + β22 ∗ SEC + β23 ∗ ECO
+ β24 ∗ LEG + β25 ∗ EDU (2)
We began by calculating the variance inflation factor
(VIF) to discover and address the presence of multi-
collinearity in the regression modeld. The four aspects of
WGI were significantly collinear, i.e., VIF>5. Thus, we
combined the four governance factors into one by adding
all four and called it WGI. Similarly, GDP per capita as
well as GDP per capita by PPP were also significantly
collinear, i.e., VIF>5. We excluded GDP per capita, while
GDP per capita by PPP was retained as an indicator of
relative deprivation. Number of fixed broadband Internet
subscribers was significantly collinear with the number of
Internet users, i.e., VIF>5. Since number of fixed broad-
band Internet subscribers had less number of missing
values, we retained it variable in the model instead of
the number of Internet users. For the remaining model
VIF values did not indicate strong multicollinearity, i.e.,
VIF<5.
We also examined themodel for heteroskedasticitye.We
plotted the residuals for the model as a histogram.We also
computed the Shapiro test to examine whether the residu-
als were normally distributed. For Equation 1, the p value
for the test was much less than 0.001, i.e., the evidence
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indicates heteroskedasticity. For Equation 2, the p value
was 0.715, i.e., the null hypothesis cannot be rejected
or there is not enough evidence for heteroskedasticity.
For the first model, we then used the White-Huber
method to generate heteroskedasticity-corrected covariance
matrices.
To facilitate the regression analyses, we transformed
both the dependent and the independent variables. Some
independent variables, e.g., GDP per capita by PPP, had
a wide range and thus the regression will be dominated
by the size effect. For such variables, we log transformed
the data. Appropriate variables were identified by notic-
ing the presence of outliers in the box plots. Independent
variables log transformed were GDP per capita by PPP,
number of fixed broadband Internet subscribers, secure
Internet servers, and secure Internet servers (per million
people).
Given that OLS regression is a parametric test, it makes
additional assumptions regarding the dependent variable;
specifically, OLS assumes that the dependent variable is
continuous and normally distributed. Recall we had two
dependent variables: (1) volume of spam and (2) per-
centage of spambots. The counts for spam volume were
converted to percentages, i.e., we divided the amount of
spam from a country by the total volume of spam (from all
countries in this dataset). The corresponding histogram as
well as the Shapiro test did not indicate that the data was
normally distributed; p value for the Shapiro test was ≈ 0.
Simultaneously, the box plot indicated several outliers.
Thus, this dependent variable was also log transformed.
The second dependent variable was the percentage of
spambots within a country for different countries. The
normality assumption was not satisfied, either by eye-
balling the histogram, or by the Shapiro test; p value for
the Shapiro test was <<0.001. The box plot again indi-
cated several outliers. Thus, this dependent variable was
log transformed.
Results
Tables 2 and 3 presents the summary statistics for all the
dependent and independent variables. The spam dataset
from Indiana University (Bloomington) was highly corre-
lated with the spambot dataset fromMicrosoft; cor = 0.87,
p value <<0.001, n = 79 (where n is the number of coun-
tries compared). The correlations between the dependent
variables and independent variables is given in Table 4f.
OLS was applied to Equations 1 and 2g. The results are
given in Tables 5 and 6; the effective sample sizes were 117
and 69, respectively.
Discussion
The relative volume of spam is highly skewed in its distri-
bution. The top seven countries accounted for 51.53% of
the total volume of spam received by Indiana University




Indiana University* 38,510.0 106,352.2
Microsoft* 2.453 3.83
Independent variable
GDP per capita by PPP* 14,017.2 15,117.01
Fixed broadband Internet subscribers
(FBIS)*
2,859,683 11,877,249
Fixed broadband Internet subscribers
(per 100 people)
9.96 12.14
Internet users (per 100 people) 35.47 28.00
Secure Internet servers* 5,560.237 34,338.54
Secure Internet servers (per one million
people)*
367.6445 1,151.99
Computer, comm., and other services
(% exports)
29.08 19.49
Computer, comm., and other services
(% imports)
30.81 16.18
World governance indicators (WGI) 305.7658 158.0306
Asterisk (*) indicates that these variables have not been transformed.
(Bloomington), indicating that most of the offending bots
are concentrated jurisdictionally; these seven countries
were India, Russian Federation, USA, Vietnam, Indonesia,
Brazil, and China, respectively, with India accounting for
the largest volume of spam. Previous research noted this




Indiana University* -3.29 2.76
Microsoft* 2.45 3.83
Independent Variable
GDP per capita by PPP* 8.90 1.25
Fixed broadband Internet subscribers
(FBIS)*
11.45 3.14
Fixed broadband Internet subscribers
(per 100 people)
9.96 12.14
Internet users (per 100 people) 35.47 28.00
Secure Internet servers* 4.62 2.84
Secure Internet servers (per one million
people)*
3.09 2.90
Computer, comm., and other services
(% exports)
29.08 19.49
Computer, comm., and other services
(% imports)
30.81 16.18
World governance indicators (WGI) 205.06 111.38
Asterisk (*) indicates that these variables have been transformed as described in
the text.
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GDP per capita by PPP 0.46*** (145) 0.15 (75)
Fixed broadband Internet subscribers
(FBIS)
0.84*** (164) 0.68*** (77)
Fixed broadband Internet subscribers
(per 100 people)
0.39*** (164) 0.17 (77)
Internet users (per 100 people) 0.43*** (156) 0.12 (77)
Secure Internet servers 0.74*** (172) 0.46*** (78)
Secure Internet servers (per one
million people)
0.23** (172) 0.08 (78)
Computer, comm, and other services
(% exports)
0.29*** (141) 0.29* (73)
Computer, comm, and other services
(% imports)
0.28*** (141) 0.27* (73)
World governance indicators (WGI) 0.29*** (168) 0.08 (79)
Significant codes: ‘***’ <0.001, ‘**’ <0.01, ‘*’ <0.05.
concentration even for ISPs, i.e., most of the spambots are
concentrated to the handful of ISPs. Simultaneously, such
ISPs were popular, well established, and thus potentially
susceptible to regulatory pressure. Given that most spam
is concentrated in a handful of countries, regulatory solu-
tions to spam then appears to be a tangible and tractable
option; only a small subset of countries would need to
agree to regulate an admittedly larger but still a relatively
malleable set of ISPs.
Table 5 OLS regressionmodel: Indiana University [Spam]
Linear regression Estimate Standard
error
Pr (> |t|)
(Intercept) -11.657 2.622 ≈0***





subscribers (per 100 people)
-0.051 0.033 0.123
Internet users (per 100 people) 0.002 0.016 0.918
Secure Internet servers 0.242 0.212 0.257
Secure Internet servers
(per one million people)
0.208 0.161 0.201
Computer, comm., and other
services (% exports)
-0.002 0.010 0.835





-0.007 0.003 0.0137 *
Significant codes: ‘***’ <0.001, ‘**’ <0.01, ‘*’ <0.05; residual standard error, 1.327
on 108 degrees of freedom; multiple R-squared, 0.7649; adjusted R-squared,
0.7453; F-statistic, 39.03 on 9 and 108 DF; p value, <2.2e-16.
Table 6 OLS regressionmodel: Microsoft [Spambots]
Linear regression Estimate Standard
error
Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept) -4.057 2.592 0.123
GDP per capita by PPP -0.133 0.392 0.736
Fixed broadband Internet
subscribers
0.255 0.125 0.046 *
Fixed broadband Internet
subscribers (per 100 people)
-0.019 0.025 0.469
Internet users (per 100 people) -0.016 0.013 0.210
Secure Internet servers 0.388 0.146 0.010 *
Secure Internet servers
(per one million people)
-0.011 0.198 0.954
Computer, comm., and other
services (% exports)
0.002 0.008 0.742






Significant codes: ‘***’ <0.001, ‘**’< 0.01, ‘*’ <0.05; residual standard error,
0.8288 on 60 degrees of freedom; multiple R-squared, 0.6057; adjusted
R-squared, 0.5466; F-statistic, 10.24 on 9 and 60 DF; p value, 2.284e-09.
Overall the evidence in the paper indicates that the
prevalence of both spam and spambots is best explained
by routine activity theory of crime [53], which consid-
ers crime as a function of motivated offenders, available
targets, and lack of guardianship. We tested two of these
variables, i.e., available targets and guardianship, both of
which were important in predicting the volume of spam;
the third variable, motivated offenders, is not relevant
online as all targets can be considered proximal and thus
appropriate for infectionh. Unlike crime offline, spam
and spambots appear to increase with the availability
of guardianship. Therefore, previous policy prescriptions
grounded in routine activity theory may not be directly
applicable online. However, the exploration and transla-
tion of such prescriptions from offline to online does sug-
gest a first step in providing potential solutions that can
complement regulatory efforts grounded in deterrence.
Availability
We find that all measures of availability, number of users
connecting to the Internet, were directly and statistically
significantly correlated with the total volume of spam
(Table 4). Intuitively, as the number of users increases,
so would the number of individual systems and email
accounts that can then be used to send out spam. Relative
volume of spam is driven by the number of fixed broad-
band Internet subscribers from a country, as it is the only
measure of availability that is statistically significant in the
regression analysis (Table 5). In previous research, Eeten
et al. [25] similarly noted that the total volume of spam
from an ISP was driven by the size of its user base.
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The percentage of systems acting as spambots in a
country is, however, not statistically correlated with all
measures of availability. In fact, only the total number of
fixed broadband Internet subscribers (FBIS) was statisti-
cally correlated with the percentage of spambots (Table 4).
FBIS was also the only statistically significant measure of
availability in the regression model (Table 6). This indi-
cates that higher adoption may lead to higher percentage
of spambots. This is contrary to previous work by Eeten
et al. [25], who found that while bigger ISPs might do worse
in total volume of spam, they perform marginally bet-
ter in terms of percentages. ISPs and national economies
may then differ in this respect. Alternatively, the differ-
ence might be an artifact of the countries under analysis;
Eeten et al. [25] concentrated on OECD countries.
There are several potential explanations for why Inter-
net adoption may increase the percentage of spambots.
The foremost and simplest explanation is that increased
Internet adoption may simply mean more number of
people clicking on links and navigating to different web-
sites, increasing their risk exposure. Then, higher Inter-
net adoption would not just indicate more spambots
and spam, but also more malware infections and bots
in general. This explanation can be tested by examin-
ing the correlations between measures of availability and
malware-infected machines and zombies in future studies
using other datasets. In concurrent work, we find evidence
that suggests that this hypothesis may not be accurate,
as number of malware infected machines was negatively
correlated with FBIS [61].
A second explanation is that early adopters are typi-
cally those who are interested in new technologies, are
more technically literate, and have higher education and
income. They would be more aware of security risks
and more capable of risk mitigation. However, as Inter-
net adoption progresses, systems would be available less
informed and economically constrained individuals who
would then be limited in their incentives and ability to
protect their systems. This explanation is contingent on
two variables: education and income (which is highly
correlated with education [62]). Education can be exam-
ined by using country-level measures of individual literacy
rates as well as community-based measures, such as pub-
lic spending on education. Correspondingly, there would
be distinct policy implicationsi.
A third potential but tenuous hypothesis may be that
when Internet adoption is low, those that adopt technolo-
gies are more homogenous. To the extent that security
awareness and corresponding mitigation strategies are
contingent on stories exchanged in communities [63], the
exposure of a homogenous community would be lower.
While it is difficult to test this relationship on a country
level, it may be possible by looking at indicators of income
inequality, e.g., GINI index.
A fourth possibility is the higher penetration allows
faster spread of infections as epidemiological models are
driven by concentrations [54]. However, there is limited
evidence for this. None of the measures for concentration,
e.g., Internet users per 100 people, were correlated with
the percentage of spambots in a country. However, it is
difficult to access the epidemiological impact of malware
spread as this is a static model with static independent
variables. It may be better to consider the rate of change in
the number of Internet users for individual countries. The
optimal solution would be to conduct a time series anal-
ysis on historical spam data. Such data is, however, not
currently available to the researchers.
Guardianship
Security (or guardianship), i.e., secure Internet server
(SIS), was directly correlated with both the relative vol-
ume of spam from a country as well as the percentage
of spambots in individual countries (Table 4). These cor-
relations were statistically significant. However, SIS was
not significant in the regression model for the relative vol-
ume for spam (Table 5). It may be that the relationship
between SIS and relative volumes of spam is not linear as
Spearman’s coefficient indicates both linear and non-
linear correlations. SIS was, however, significant in explain-
ing the percentage of spambots in individual countries
(Table 6).
A first explanation for this is that as the number of users
in the local market increases, the number of SIS would
consequently have to increase. Thus, more SIS is simply
an indicator of Internet adoption. As noted earlier in this
section, Internet adoption may lead to more infections.
Thus, as the Internet grows not only does the volume
of spam increases so does the percentage of spambots.
It could be argued that SIS do not need to be juris-
dictionally co-located with their target market. However,
given that SIS is highly correlated with all measures of
availability (p value <<0.001), this hypothesis has limited
support.
A second explanation then could be that the security
of the SIS itself is broken. Personnel in charge may sim-
ply be following ‘best practices’ to secure such servers,
which is security often means ‘common practices’ rather
than indicate a measure of quality. It may then be that
due to inadequate security, these servers may themselves
have become vector for spambot-related malware infec-
tions. From a rational choice perspective, trusted systems
would attract more attacks as the return on investment
would be higher. Problems with SSL implementations are
well documented [64]; this could easily extend to other
encryption implementations on such servers. However,
concurrent research indicates that more SIS do not lead
to higher rate of malware infections in general [61]. Thus,
this hypothesis currently does not have support.
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Economic deprivation
The sole indicator of economic resources, i.e., GDP per
capita by PPP, was directly and significantly correlated
with the relative volume of spam. However, the corre-
lation with percentage of spambots was not significant.
GDP per capita by PPP was also not significant in either
of the regression models. Overall, there seems to be lim-
ited evidence for the influence of economic resources on
prevalence or spam or associated botnets. The evidence
that is available indicates a positive relationship; both the
correlations are positive and so are the signs for the esti-
mates in both regression models. This is counterintuitive
based on previous research. To the extent that economic
resources constrain individual ability to purchase legal
copies of software [43], higher rates of software piracy
should be positively correlated with spam [25]. Similarly,
if limited expendable income impinges, the individual
ability to purchase security technologies, e.g., anti-virus
software, higher GDP per capita by PPP should also lower
spam and spambots.
There are two possible explanations for this counter-
intuitive observation. The simplest explanation is that
to the extent that economic resources impact Internet
adoption, GDP per capita by PPP also indicates the indi-
vidual ability to participate in the market as an Internet
user. As noted earlier in this section, adoption may lead
to higher volume of spam and percentage of spambots.
A second, more tenuous, behavioral explanation is that
as GDP per capita by PPP increases, adoption of legal
software as well as anti-malware technologies is pro-
portionally impinged. However, individuals compensate
for risk mitigating technologies by demonstrating higher
risk behavior. There is evidence for such static risk bud-
gets offline. For example, the introduction of ABS did
not reduce overall risk as drivers compensated by driv-
ing closer to other vehicles [65]. Both these hypotheses
can be tested by replacing GDP per capita by PPP with
more direct measures of economic resources such rates
of software copyright infringement and market penetra-
tion of anti-virus software. While statistics for copyright
infringement are readily available from Business Software
Alliance, similar data for market penetration of security
technologies is admittedly harder to acquire.
Social support/altruism
Indicator of legal framework and overall governance, i.e.,
World Governance Indicator (WGI), was significantly and
positively correlated with the volume of spam (though
not with the percentage of spambots) (Table 4). On the
ISP level, better specific governance initiatives have been
found to be correlated with lower levels of botnet activ-
ity [25]; however, the specific independent variables under
consideration were different. WGI was also significant in
the regression model for the relative percentage of spam
from individual countries (Table 5). To the extent that bet-
ter governance creates a subsidy for individual end-user
consumption of ICT technologies by facilitating the evo-
lution of local ICTmarkets, this subsidymay not extend to
individual investment in security. This is not unexpected,
as from a macro-behavioral perspective the security mar-
ket suffers from clear signals and is thus a market of
lemons [66].
Both proxies for technical skills were positively and sig-
nificantly correlated with both the relative volume of spam
as well as the percentage of spambots. These measures
do not directly measure either individual literacy rates or
technical education in general; instead, they indicate the
amount of technical skills that are available to the econ-
omy as a whole. Technical skills then indicate a weak
relationship with lowering the incidence of spam or spam-
bot, as they were not significant in either of the regression
models. The statistical significance of their correlations
with the volume of spam and percentage of spambots can
be explained as a function of Internet adoption. The rela-
tionship between (export and imports of ) computer, com-
munications, and other services and Internet adoption is
obvious; more exports and imports of ICT services should
indicate higher Internet adoption in the local market.
Conclusions
Spam is concentrated, both jurisdictionally and on the
network. Merely seven countries appear to generate more
than 50% of spam. Similarly, most spam is concentrated to
a handful of ISPs. We argue that this allows the possibility
of deterrence through regulation. Appropriate legal incen-
tives in less than ten countries would address more than
half the spam in the world. Simultaneously, the enforce-
ment of such legislation would be relatively cheap, as
only a handful of actors (roughly 50 ISPs) would need to
be monitored. Absent the influence of economic depri-
vation on the prevalence of spam/spambots, there is no
argument for software subsidies in low-income markets
as a solution to botnets. In fact, the problem of spam
seems to be a macro level lack of governance; simultane-
ously, spambots are impinged by broader infrastructure
management issues as those with secure Internet servers.
Governance efforts such as the German Botnet Initiative
have been promising. Simultaneously, minimum security
can be mandated for network providers such as secure
Internet servers. While specific policy prescriptions are
beyond the scope of this paper, in concurrent research,
we argue for ex-ante regulations for addressing spambots
[20]. Future research should address the relative costs of
policy prescriptions as public or private interventions vs.
a common-pool regime.
Of the different theories of criminology tested in this
paper, routine activity theory was the most significant
driver of spam and associated botnets. As expected as
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Internet adoption increases, the total volume of spam goes
up. Counterintuitively, Internet adoption also increases
the percentage of offending machines. The likely expla-
nation is that investments in Internet adoption are not
proportionally matched by those in education. Lack of
education impinge individuals in two ways. First, they are
limited in their awareness of security risks. Second, even
when they are aware, they may not have enough infor-
mation to adequately assess the risk and construct an
appropriate response.
Unlike in traditional routine activity theory, where
crime is driven by lack of guardianship, spam and asso-
ciated bots are instead correlated with the presence of
secure Internet servers. This difference does not allow us
to directly transfer policy insights offline to countering
spam. However, it does provide an alternative perspective
to the problem and allow us to develop a framework for
systematic inquiry toward engendering long-term public
policy and technical solutions.
In this paper, we addressed two research questions.
First, what economic factors explain the variance in the
relative volume of spam seen from different countries.
Second, what economic factors explain the variance the
percentage of systems acting as spambots across different
nations. We find that large volumes of spam and/or spam-
bots are correlated with higher rates of Internet adoption
and presence of secure Internet servers. Our research
is theoretically grounded in previous investigations of
security economics online as well as criminology offline.
While some of our results reify previous microeconomic
investigations, others are contradictory. Thus, research
investigating individual markets may not be generalizable
national economies.
Future work includes repeating this analysis over time
to evaluate if changes in the population of spambots are
correlated with economic changes; this would be helpful
in establishing a causal link rather than just a correlational
one. Further, our hope is to collaborate with additional
institutions who might share their data. In particular,
institutional data sets from corporations and non-US
institutions are ideal tests of this model.
Endnotes
aIn our analysis we do not consider the presence of
motivated offenders. Offline motivated offenders is given
by proximity to the target. Online, however, all attackers
are proximal. It may be that attackers prefer to attack
systems that are fewer hops away; however, we do not
know of any evidence that indicates support for this
hypothesis online. Arguably, it is possible to compute a
distance metric for the average distance between two
systems in two different countries. However, given that
we do not have information on the command and control
center for the spambots in out data set, even if such
distance metric was available, it could not possibly be
applied to this data.
bSee http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.
SECR.P6.
cEeten et al. [25] used education as a proxy variable for
technical skills. Unfortunately, the World Bank data for
education was sparsely populated. Then, using education
as a proxy variable would have left out several countries
from our analyses. Thus, we decided on a different proxy
variable. Note that the size of the ICT market does not
encapsulate individual security education, but instead
provides a measurement for security skills available to
the market as a whole.
dMulticollinearity is observed when two or more
independent variables are highly correlated, i.e., at least
one of the independent variables can be computed as a
linear combination of the rest to a statistically significant
degree. If the independent variables are multicollinear,
then the results for the ordinary least squared regression
may be computed incorrectly.
eHeteroskedasticity is observed when the residuals for
a model are not normally distributed. This happens when
the variance of a variable does not increase or decrease
proportionally with respect to a second variable.
fSince we use Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient
(which is sensitive to outliers), the variables were
transformed as described above before computing the
specific values. Note that we do not use Pearson’s
coefficient as many of the independent variables are not
normally distributed. Furthermore, since log
transformation is order preserving, it does not impact
Spearman. However, log transformation allows us to have
a data set without outliers.
gNote that while the independent variables are not
normally distributed, OLS is still applicable as the sample
size is large [67].
hFor example, previous research has noted that most
botnets include bots that are spread over 30 to a 100
countries [68]. Simultaneously, for spam, the associated
bots do not require extra bandwidth or longer uptime, it
is unlikely that bots in one country would be preferred
over another [3].
iEeten et al. [25] note that higher education levels did
in fact indicate lower rates of spam. However, as noted by
other findings in this paper, results from ISPs may not
directly apply to national economies or those from
OECD to countries globally.
Appendix
Indiana University (Bloomington) data collection
strategy
The spam data spans between 25 July 2010 and 27 March
2011 (≈ 8 months). There were 9.7 million messages. Of
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these, 6.0 million were classified as spam and 3.7 million
were deemed legitimate. From this data set, we have ≈
62% spam which is below the upper bound given by
Symantec.
All email messages are subjected to two spam filters.
The primary filter is an IP address based blacklist. This
filter provides a binary output as either an ‘OK,’ which
results in the message being exposed to the second filter
or a ‘REJECT’ at which time it is discarded and deemed
spam. Additionally, the output of the first filter also pro-
vides a time and date stamp as well as an IP address.
The second filter subjects the email to several spam clas-
sifiers. The email is accepted if the message is internal,
has less than a 60% probability of being spam, and is on a
whitelist or department supported mailing list, or a virus
is successfully removed. Spam messages are accepted but
considered to be spam if there is a greater than 60%, but
less than 99%, probability of being spam. Messages may
be accepted with a warning notification regarding suspi-
cious attachments. Messages are rejected if they have a
virus, an illegal attachment type, a greater than 99% prob-
ability of being spam or other instantiation of a virus. For
our analysis, we combined messages that were accepted
spam, rejected spam, as well as messages regarding viruses
in one spam category.
Wemake three assumptions. First, we assume that spam
and only spam are caught by the two filter systems, i.e.,
no spam gets let through accidentally and legitimate mes-
sages do get tossed away accidentally. Second, we assume
that IP addresses and hostnames correspond to spambots
and are not spoofed. Third, we assume that all the spam
was sent by spambots.
Additionally, there weremessages aborted during recep-
tion due to a dropped connection or invalid recipient
addresses. It is unknown if these were blanket spam
attacks that put in incorrect addresses, people acciden-
tally mistyping emails, or people/organizations that had
not updated their email lists and were emailing peo-
ple no longer at Indiana University (Bloomington) and
whose email addresses were no longer valid. Thus, these
messages have not been included in the current analysis.
There is also a ‘none’ status in the second filter, which
was used twice in the 8 months, but it is unknown what
this status meant. These messages were thrown out, as 2
messages out of 9.7 million are insignificant.
Each line of the spam data from the second filter con-
tained a unique identifier, stating whether a message is
local, (from) Indiana (University), or external, a time and
date stamp, anonymized ‘from’ and ‘to’ tags, the result of
the analysis of the email, filters, the percent chance that it
is spam (if it does not hit one of the automatic exceptions,
e.g., the whitelist), and the relay hostname or IP address.
We used an IP lookup database with a 95% accuracy rate
to determine the spam ‘messages’ country of origin. For
the secondary messages without IP addresses, we looked
at country-level domains (.br, .ua, .gov, etc.) to determine
the originating country of spammessages. For all top-level
domains (.com, .net, .org), we had to throw these spam
messages into an unknown origins category for a lack of
accuracy with respect to the originating location. These
methods are reflected in other spam studies [9,69].
Microsoft data
There were a total of 80 countries in the data set. India
had the higher percentage of spambots with 10.9% of the
machines acting as spambots in the first quarter of 2011
and 11.0 % in the second. Jordan had the lowest percent-
age with 0.06% of machines acting as spambots in the first
quarter of 2011 and 0.10 % in the second. Table 7 provides
summary statistics for the data.
Table 7 Summary statistics for Microsoft spambot data
Statistics 1Q11 2Q11
Minimum 0.06 0.10
First quarter 0.21 0.19
Median 0.45 0.45
Mean 1.14 1.31
Third quarter 1.30 1.00
Maximum 10.90 11.00
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